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THE MORAL MOTIVES. 3^5 we seek and avoid. The goods are always relatively good only, good for something — as means to ends — and a bad use can be made of all that nature and fortune give us as well as a good one. That which duty commands is an end in itself, in itself good, absolutely worthful, and no misuse of it is possible. It might be supposed that pleasure, that happi- ness is an ultimate end. But men have very different opinions in regard to what is pleasant, one holding one thing pleasurable and another another. It is impossible to discover by empirical methods what duty demands of all men alike and under all circumstances; the appeal is to our reason, not to our sensibility. If happiness were the end of rational beings, then nature had endowed us but poorly for it, since instead of an unfailing instinct she has given us the weak and deceitful reason as a guide, which, with its train, culture, science, art, and luxury, has brought more trouble than satisfaction to mankind. Man has a destiny other than well-being, and a higher one — the formation of good dispositions: here we have the only thing in the whole world that can never be used for evil, the only thing that does not borrow its value from a higher end, but itself originally and inalienably contains it, and that gives value to all else that merits esteem. " Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." Un- derstanding, courage, moderation, and whatever other mental gifts or praiseworthy qualities of temperament may be cited, as also the gifts of fortune, "are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects, but they may also become extremely evil and mischievous, if the will which is to make use of them is not good." These are the classic words with which Kant commences the Foundatiofi of tlu Metaphysics of Ethics. When does the will deserve the predicate "good " ? Let us listen to the popular moral consciousness, which distin- guishes three grades of moral recognition. He who refrains from that which is contrary to duty, no matter from what motives — as, for example, the shopkeeper who does not cheat because he knows that honesty is the best policy — receives moderate praise for irreproachable outward behavior. Wc