Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/424

402 KANT. maintained ; and in opposition to its rationalization, its character as feeling. This relation of the Kantian aesthetics to that of his predecessors explains both its fundamental tendency and the elements in it which appear defective and erroneous. In any case, Kant shows himself in this field also an unapproachable master of careful analysis. The first task of aesthetics is the careful distinction of its i object from related phenomena. The beautiful has points ' of contact with the agreeable, the good, the perfect, the useful, and the true. It is distinguished from the true by the fact that it is not an object of knowledge, but of satis- faction. If we inquire further into the difference between, the satisfaction in the beautiful and the satisfaction in the . agreeable, in the good (in itself), and in the (good for some- thing, as a means, or in the) useful, which latter three have this in common, that they are objects of appetition — of sensuous want, of moral will, of prudential desire — it becomes evident that the beautiful pleases through its mere representation (that is, independently of the real ex- istence of the object), and that the delight in the beautiful is a contemplative pleasure. It is for contemplation only, not to be sensuously enjoyed nor put to practical use ; and, further, its production is not a universal duty. Sensuous, prudential, or moral appetition has always an " interest " in the actual existence of the object ; the beautiful, on the other hand, calls forth a disinterested satisfaction. According to quality the beautiful is the object of a dis- interested, free (bound by no interest), and sportive satisfac- tion. According to quantity and modality the judgment of taste claims universal and necessary validity, without this being based upon concepts. This posits further dif- ferences between the beautiful and the agreeable and the good. The good also pleases universally, but it pleases through concepts ; the agreeable as well as the beautiful pleases without a concept, but it does not please uni- versally. That which pleases the reason through the concept is good ; that which pleases the senses in sensation is agree- able. That which pleases universally and necessarily with- out a concept is beautiful. Moral judgment demands the