Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/477

This page needs to be proofread.

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 4SS which remain concealed from common consciousness, sunk in the outcome of these acts. The theoretical part of the system explains the representation of objective reality (the feeling connected with certain representations that we are compelled to have them), from pure self-consciousness, whose opposing moments, a real and an ideal force, limit each other by degrees, — and follows the development of spirit in three periods ("epochs"). The first of these ex- tends from sensation, in which the ego finds itself limited, to productive intuition, in which a thing in itself is posited over against the ego and the phenomenon between the two ; the second, from this point to reflection (feeling of self, outer and inner intuition together with space and time, the cate- gories of relation as the original categories) ; the third, finally, through judgment, wherein intuition and concept are separated as well as united, up to the absolute act of will. Willing is the continuation and completion of intu- ition ; * intuition was unconscious production, willing is conscious production. It is only through action that thci world becomes objective for us, only through interaction r with other active intelligences that the ego attains to the consciousness of a real external world, and to the con- sciousness of its freedom. The practical part follows the will from impulse (the feeling of contradiction between the ideal and the object) through the division into moral law and resistant natural impulse up to arbitrary will. Obser- vations on legal order, on the state, and on history are » added as "supplements" The law of right, by which un- lawful action is directed against itself, is not a moral, but a natural order, which operates with blind necessity. The state, like law, is a product of the genus, and not of indi- viduals. The ideal of a cosmopolitan legal condition is

  • With this transformation of the antithesis between knowledge and volition into a mere difference in degree, Schelling sinks back to the standpoint of Leib-nitz. In all the idealistic thinkers who start from Kant we find the endeavor to overcome the Critical dualism of understanding and will, as also that between

intellect and sensibility. Schiller brings the contrary impulses of the ego into ultimate harmonious union in artistic activity. Fichte traces them back to a common ground ; Schelling combines both these methods by extolling art as a restoration of the original identity. Hegel reduces volition to thought, Schopenhauer makes intellect proceed from will.