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49^ HEGEL. and caprice), and happiness ; jfinally, the unity of the know- ing and willing spirit, free spirit or rational will, which in turn realizes itself in right, ethics, and history. (d) The Doctrine of Objective Spirit, comprehending ethics, the philosophy of right, of the state, and of history, is Hegel's most brilliant achievement. It divides as follows: (i) Right (property, contract, punishment); (2) Morality i (purpose, intention and welfare, good and evil) ; (3) Social I Morality: {a) the family; {b) civil society; (r) the state ' (internal and external polity, and the history of the world). In right the will or freedom attains to outer actuality, in morality it attains to inner actuality, in social morality to objective and subjective actuality at once, hence to com- plete actuality. Right, as it were a second, higher nature, because a neces- sity posited and acknowledged by spirit, is originally a sum of prohibitions ; wherever it seems to command the nega- tive has only received a positive expression. Private right contains two things — the warrant to be a person, and the injunction to respect other persons as such. Property is the external sphere which the will gives to itself; without prop- erty no personality. Through punishment (retaliation) right is restored against un-right {Unrecht), and the latter shown to be a nullity. The criminal is treated according to the same maxim as that of his action — that coercion is allowable. In the stadium of morality the good exists in the form of a requirement which can never be perfectly fulfilled, as a mere imperative ; there remains an irrepressible opposition between the moral law and the individual will, between intention and execution. Here the judge of good and evil is the conscience, which is not secure against error. That which is objectively evil may seem good and a duty to subjective conviction. (According to Fichte this was im- possible). On account of the conflict between duty and will, which is at this stage irrepressible, Hegel is unable to con- sider morality, the sphere of the subjective disposition, supreme. He thinks he knows a higher sphere, wherein legality and morality become one: "social morality" {Sitt- lickkeit). This sphere takes its name from Sitte, that i