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54' saw PEN HA UER. subservience to the will. Brain and thought are the same; the former is nothing other than the will to know, as the stomach is will to digest. Those only talk of an imma. terial soul who import into philosophy — where such ideas do not belong — concepts taught them when they were confirmed. Schopenhauer's philosophy is as rich in inconsistencies as his personality was self-willed and unharmonious. " He carries into his system all the contradictions and whims of his capricious nature," says Zeller, From the most radical idealism (the objective world a product of representa- tion) he makes a sharp transition to the crassest material- ism (thought a function of the brain) ; first m.atter is to be a mere idea, now thought is to be merely a material phenom- enon ! The third and fourth books of The World as Will and Idea y which develop the aesthetic and ethical standpoint of their autlior, stand in as sharp a contradiction to the first (noetical) and the second (metaphysical) books as these to each other. While at first it was maintained that all representation issubject to the principle of suffi- cient reason, we are now told that, besides causal cognition, there is a higher knowledge, one which is free from the control of this principle, viz., aesthetic and philosophical intuition. If, before, it was said that the intellect is the creature and servant of the will, we now learn that in favored individuals it gains the power to throw off the yoke of slavery, and not only to raise itself to the blessed- ness of contemplation free from all desire, but even to enter on a victorious conflict with the tyrant, to slay the will. The source of this power — is not revealed. R. Haym {A. SchopenJiauer, 1864, reprinted from the PreiissiscJie Jahr- biieher) was not far wrong in characterizing Schopenhauer's philosophy as a clever novel, which entertains the reader by its rapid vicissitudes. The contemplation which is free from causality and will is the essence of aesthetic life; the partial and total subla- tion, the quieting and negation of the will, that of ethical life. It is but seldom, and only in the artistic and philo- sophical' genius, that the intellect succeeds in freeing itself from the supremacy of the will, and, laying aside the