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6^l6 NEO-KAcVTIANS. which can be experienced, yet at the same time con- ceives the formal element in the sense world as the product of the organization of man, and hence makes objects con- form to our representations. Above the sensuous world of experience and of mechanical becoming, however, the specu- lative impulse to construction, rounding off the fragmentary- truth of the sciences into a unified picture of the whole truth, rears the ideal world of that which ought to be. Notwith- standing their indefeasible certitude, the Ideas possess no scientific truth, though they have a moral value which makes them more than mere fabrics of the brain : man is framed not merely for the knowledge of truth, but also for the real- ization of values. But since the signifiance of the Ideas is only practical, and since determinations of value are not grounds of explanation, science and metaphysics or " concept poetry *' {JBegriffsdichtung) must be kept strictly separate. Friedrich Paulsen of Berlin (born in 1846; cf. pp. 330, 332, note) sees in the Kantian philosophy the foundation for the philosophy of the future. A profounder Wolff (the self-dominion of the reason), a Prussian Hume (the categories of the understanding are not world-categories; rejection of anthropomorphic metaphysics), and a Ger- man Rousseau (the primacy of the will, consideration of the demands of the heart; the good will alone, not deeds nor culture, constitutes the worth of man ; freedom, the rights of man) in one person, Kant has withdrawn from scientific discussion the question concerning the depend- ence of reality on values or the good, which is theoretically insoluble but practically to be answered in the affirmative, and given it over to faith. Kant is in so far a positivist that he limits the mission of knowledge to the reduction of the temporo-spatial relations of phenomena to rules, and declares the teleological power of values to be undemonstrable. But science is able to prove this much, that the belief in a suprasensible world, in the indestructibility of that which alone has worth, and in the freedom of the intelligible char- acter, which the will demands, is not scientifically impossi- ble. Since, according to formal rationalism, the whole order of nature is a creation of the understanding, and