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HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE.
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is sixty years last month since my father, Judge William D. Kelley, became a member of the House of Representatives and in those days it took a great deal of courage for a man to do what he did year after year—introduce this resolution which you are considering to-day. He did it partly, I think, out of chivalrous regard for Miss Anthony, Mrs. Stanton and the few brave women who fifty years ago patiently came before your predecessors; but very much more he introduced that resolution because he believed it was essentially just. He saw in those days the beginnings of the industrial change in the midst of which we now live and they appalled him. He saw how difficult it had been for his widowed mother to get an education for himself and his sisters, and how infinitely difficult life was for the whole great class of women, not only widows but those who by the circumstances of our changing industries had been forced out into the industrial market. He believed they ought to have the same power to protect their own interests as had been given to the American workingman and which he helped give to the negro....

Women now do not count in our communities at all in proportion to the responsibilities which they carry. One of the gentlemen has asked: “What is the relation of all this labor talk to the ballot?” I will give you some examples: I was for four years the head of the factory inspectors of Illinois. During that time we had an eighthour law enacted for the protection of women and children employed in manufacturing industries. The Supreme Court held that it was contrary to the constitutions of the State and of the United States for women to be deprived of the right to work twenty-four hours whenever it suited the convenience of the employers. The court said —and it took 9,000 words to say it—that women could not be deprived of working unlimited hours, because they were citizens, although it said the term “citizenship” was limited; the Court said they could not be allowed to work underground in mines; they could not be allowed to work out their taxes on the roads, as farmers do; they could not be called to the militia; they could not vote except for school committees and once in four years for the trustees of the State University, but, with those minor deductions, they were citizens and could not be deprived of the freedom of contract.

The Supreme Court of the United States has proclaimed that the Judges of Illinois guessed wrong on that occasion, that it is not contrary to the Constitution of the United States to limit the working hours of women but that it is the obvious duty of every Legislature to do this in the interest of public health and morals. A year ago, largely through the efforts of Mrs. Robins, the Legislature tried it again and passed this time a ten-hour law for women. A Judge was found who held that it was a legitimate object for an injunction and he enjoined my successor, the present factory inspector, and the prosecuting attorney from enforcing this law. To-day under that injunction the women are again free to work twenty-four hours, as they do one day in the week quite regularly in the laundries in