446 GODEHEU AND DE LEYR1T. CH ^ R availed nothing ; that but for his promptitude in recog- nising and employing merit, Clive might even have 1754. languished in obscurity. Nor was his tact inferior to his determination. He would have treated with Dupleix, — Dupleix being absolute master of his Presidency — on better terms than he offered Godeheu ; for he could not but feel that if France were to support Dupleix, a pro- longation of hostilities must end in an increase of French territory. He was prepared, therefore, to give up every- thing but that one point he considered necessary to the safety of the English, viz. : that the Nawwab of the Karnatik should not be a French nominee. But with Godeheu he pursued a different treatment : he saw that from the fear and malice of such a man he could wring almost anything ; he squeezed him, therefore, to an extent that left him powerless and exhausted. That, whilst doing justice to the merits of Saunders, and vindicating the policy of Dupleix, we have not wronged the memory of Godeheu, is clear from the re- corded sentiments of that functionary. What, indeed, but a feverish desire for peace at any price, and a mean jealousy of Dupleix, could have prompted him, on January 11, to sign the ignominious treaty to which we have referred, when, on December 17 preceding, the terms of the treaty having been virtually settled, and the truce still existing, he had written these words to Moracin at MachhKpatan : " Prepare everything with all promptitude to the extent of your ability, so as to make yourself safe from a coup~de-main, for it is quite possible you may be attacked before the end of January. It is by such sudden enterprises that the English begin to de- clare war ! "* He thus prepared Moracin for an attack on the Sirkars at the end of December ; and yet, on January 11 following, virtually resigned them up to the English. Not long did he remain in India to watch the working
- This correspondence is attached to the memoir of Dupleix.
