450 GODEHEU AND DE LEYRIT. chap, eastern lauds nearer Palamkota, stretching almost from x the Valaru to the Kolrun, and which the English chose 1755 to regard as feudally dependent on the Nawwab, orders were sent to Calliaud to oppose the movement, if neces- sary, by force. If the French had persisted in their pretensions, war was then inevitable. But de Leyrit, still unprepared, yielded and withdrew his troops. Nevertheless, a precedent of interference had been es- tablished on both sides, and before Godeheu reached Europe, the treaty which he carried with him had been violated in that part which was alike its main principle and its only possible justification — by the English in acting as allies of Muhammad Ali, by the French as agents of the Maisurians. De Leyrit indeed had not been long at Pondichery before he became convinced that the theory of non- interference, on which Godeheu had based his policy, was, in the actual state of India, simply impossible. Both the rival powers on the Koromandel coast having armies and strong places, both brought constantly into contact with possessors of territory whose weakness they had proved, and who were continually tempting them with offers, it was impossible that either should have the virtue on every occasion to abstain, always to restrain its hands. Excuses were found to justify, at least to their Directors in Europe, every infraction of the treaty. It is clear from the correspondence of de Leyrit with Bussy and with Dupleix,* that this feeling on his part grew stronger every day, and that he became more and more convinced of the insensate folly of Godeheu in consenting to divide a portion of the Sirkars with the English. Of these, however, the French still held possession, and were empowered to hold possession, till the ratification of the treaty should arrive, that is, till about the middle of 1756. As de
- De Leyrit to Bussy, July 29 and August 17, 1755 ; to Dupleix, October
16, and other letters.
