Page:History of the War between the United States and Mexico.djvu/115

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GENERAL TAYLOR'S FORCE TOO SMALL.
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would be before the arrival of the volunteers." He never doubted his ability to maintain himself, with the force already under his command, against the whole Mexican army; and the sequel proved that his confidence in the bravery and discipline of his men was well founded. Nevertheless, it is to be regretted that a much larger army was not sent, in the first instance, to assert, by its presence, the claim of the United States to the disputed territory. The reluctance always exhibited in Congress to increase the regular military force; the jealousy with which any proposition of that character would be regarded by the people; the supposition that it might be looked upon in England as a measure of intimidation, while the Oregon negotiation was in progress, and there was no actual war with Mexico; and the necessity of keeping the Atlantic coast, and the northern frontier, well protected, until that question was settled, were strong reasons for the course adopted by our government. But a single consideration will show that this policy was an unfortunate one, though it may have been necessary. The great body of the Mexican army at Matamoras were ignorant and cowardly, but of an excitable temperament, and, after the capture of Thornton and his dragoons, easily wrought upon to engage in any enterprise which their leaders thought proper to undertake; but had General Taylor's force been double what it was in numbers, those leaders must have seen that it would be madness to think of contending against him, and it is scarcely probable that they would have hastened on the war by crossing the river.

After the capture of the party under Captain Thornton, the Mexican detachment on the left bank of the river, commanded by General Torrejon, was increased