Had General Taylor been in a situation to advance with a large army, immediately after the capture of Matamoras, there can be no doubt that Monterey might have been taken without the least difficulty, and, perhaps, without striking a single blow. At first blush this would seem to have been a. most desirable result; but a moment's reflection will suggest an important consideration decidedly opposed to such a conclusion. The history of the war, as conducted in the provinces of California and New Mexico, presents one truth in bold and strong relief, — which is, that something more than the occupation of an enemy's territory by an armed force apparently sufficient to overawe the inhabitants, is necessary to constitute an effectual conquest. General Taylor might have overrun the whole country between the Rio Grande and the Sierra Madre, and yet there have been no safety for his army, if separated into detachments, until the enemy had concentrated their forces, and there had been a fair trial of strength in the field. To conquer a people at home, on their own soil, their moral energies must be prostrated, and that can only be done by a defeat. The loss before Monterey. was severe, but was it not better thus, than that the valley of the San Juan should have been deluged with the blood of American soldiers lulled into a false security, and unprepared for the sudden onslaught of Mexican guerilleros and rancheros?
After the arrival of the volunteers, and while waiting for boats to navigate the river, General Taylor wisely directed that the troops should be thoroughly drilled and disciplined. The sickly season came on before he proceeded up the Rio Grande, and large numbers of the volunteer corps were swept away by the noxious vapors of the tierra caliente, aggravated, no doubt, in
