ted that he would have been compelled to open his way with the bayonet. His assertion, however, is not entitled to much weight, because he undoubtedly anticipated censure, and was anxious to avoid it by representing his situation to have been desperate as possible. Military men who have examined the ground, and all the abler and more experienced officers in the army of General Taylor, concur in the opinion that the terms of the capitulation were as rigorous as ought to have been required; and he must be a bold man who would undertake to question the judgment of those who are so competent to decide.
The armistice was another feature of the capitulation to which objections were made. General Taylor was not in a situation to advance from Monterey, or to prosecute the war, on account of the severe loss he had sustained, and the want of necessary supplies, until a very few days before the expiration of the term prescribed in the article. So far, therefore, as the force under his immediate command was concerned, the delay would have been necessary under any circumstances, and could have produced no injurious results. The enemy desired the armistice; it might have had the tendency to restore friendly relations at once; and good policy required the concession to be made. But while the army was on its march to Monterey, and employed in its reduction, an expedition was planned by the President and his cabinet against Tampico and the southern part of the department of Tamaulipas, below the line which neither party was to cross while the armistice was in force. In the month of June previous, General Taylor had been placed in the full command of all the land forces of the United States operating against the republic of Mexico, south of the prov-
