irregular troops of the Caucasus, and twenty pieces of cannon. The cavalry were placed on the flanks and the artillery in the centre. To oppose this force the Persian commander had under his orders about 30,000 men, of which 16,000 were infantry, and the remainder irregular cavalry, with some artillerymen. He had also twenty-two light field-pieces, directed by an Englishman in his service. The infantry regiments were drawn up in one long line, having fourteen guns to their right and eight to their left, while the cavalry covered the flanks and rear. The battle commenced by a cannonade from both sides; the Russian artillery being so ill-served that the shot for the most part went over the heads of the Persians, doing little or no execution; while the fire of some of the Persian guns was so well directed as to compel one of the Russian divisions to retire and abandon its cannon. Two battalions, composed of the men of Karadagh, charged the retiring square, and had the remaining Persian infantry made a corresponding movement in advance at that critical moment, it is probable that victory would have crowned their effort. The great body of the troops, however, remained stationary; and the two Karadagh battalions, being unable to maintain their position without support, fell back in confusion.
It is said that at this juncture Prince Abbass Meerza was so ill-advised as to send a message to his sons to withdraw themselves from the thick of the fight. The messenger either misunderstood the order which he was to convey, or he was himself misunderstood in the midst of the noise and confusion of the battle. The result was that the young princes conceived the notion that their father wished them to withdraw the troops under their com-
