QQQ. The regulation of the Civil Nuclear sector (through the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR)) is robust. However, we have not been able to evaluate the effectiveness of the ONR in countering Hostile State Activity—indeed, when we tried to ascertain whether the powers held by the ONR were sufficient to protect national security, witnesses from the Agencies and the Cabinet Office were unable to answer. Given the significant Chinese investment in this sector, we recommend that a review of the ONR's ability to counter Hostile State Activity is undertaken.
TTT. Should the Government allow China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) to build and operate the proposed Hualong One reactor at Bradwell (or any other UK nuclear power station), we recommend that the Government set up a 'cell'—a 'nuclear' version of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre—in order to monitor the technology and its operation and address any perceived risks arising from the involvement of CGN in the UK’s Civil Nuclear sector.
SSS. While it is understandable that *** —given that Hinkley Point C is still under construction, and the remainder had not been approved at the time of writing—the finished projects must be subject to detailed (and continuing) scrutiny by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and the Intelligence Community. We expect to be kept informed of the advice provided by the Agencies and key decision timelines.
TTT. Although Chinese involvement in, and control over, UK nuclear power stations is deeply concerning, it offers only a small snapshot of the attempt to gain control over a range of sectors, and technologies, by an increasingly assertive China. The Government should commission an urgent review to examine and report on the extent to which Chinese involvement in the sector should be minimised, if not excluded.
UUU. Now is not the time to try to reach conclusions about Chinese intent or actions over the origins and development of the pandemic—it is still too soon, as it is likely that more information will come to light about Covid-19 as investigations continue. Initial work *** does appear to support public statements made by the World Health Organization and the Intelligence Community in the United States that the virus was not man-made and China did not deliberately let it spread—beyond cultural issues around failure.
VVV. However, those cultural issues—a failure to share information due to a reluctance to pass bad news up the chain, and a tendency to censor press and social media reports considered to present a negative impression—were in themselves extremely damaging to efforts to contain and, later, counter the disease. Attempts by China to suggest that the pandemic originated elsewhere show an unwillingness to change its approach—a concern, given the possibility of future pandemics.
WWW. During the pandemic, sectors not traditionally considered 'critical'—such as organisations working on a vaccine, supermarkets, logistics, haulage and medical equipment supply companies—became essential to the UK's response. The support of the Intelligence Community was key to protect the vaccine supply chain and to counter the interest shown in these 'critical' areas by hostile foreign actors.
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