45. This focus on *** indicates that open source material (for example, the studies of attempts to influence the referendum using RT and Sputnik, or social media campaigns referred to earlier) was not fully taken into account. Given that the Committee has previously been informed that open source material is now fully represented in the Government's understanding of the threat picture, it was surprising to us that in this instance it was not.
46. Whilst it may be true that some issues highlighted in open source did not require the secret investigative capabilities of the intelligence and security Agencies or were at the periphery of their remits, the Agencies nonetheless have capabilities which allow them to 'stand on the shoulders' of open source coverage: for example, GCHQ might attempt to look behind the suspicious social media accounts which open source analysis has identified to uncover their true operators (and even disrupt their use), or SIS might specifically task an agent to provide information on the extent and nature of any Russian influence campaigns.[1] However, we have found *** which suggests that ***. ***.
47. We have not been provided with any post-referendum assessment of Russian attempts at interference, ***.[2] This situation is in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, where an intelligence community assessment[3] was produced within two months of the vote, with an unclassified summary being made public. Whilst the issues at stake in the EU referendum campaign are less clear-cut, it is nonetheless the Committee's view that the UK Intelligence Community should produce an analogous assessment of potential Russian interference in the EU referendum and that an unclassified summary of it be published.[4]
48. ***. Even if the conclusion of any such assessment were that there was minimal interference, this would nonetheless represent a helpful reassurance to the public that the UK's democratic processes had remained relatively safe.
- ↑ ***
- ↑ ***
- ↑ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, 6 January 2017.
- ↑ We note that the DCMS Select Committee has called on the Government to launch an independent investigation into foreign influence, disinformation, funding, voter manipulation and the sharing of data in relation to the Scottish independence referendum, the EU referendum and the 2017 General Election. If the Government were to take up this recommendation for a wider investigation, the assessment we recommend should take place could feed into it (DCMS Select Committee, Disinformation and 'Fake News', HC 1791, 18 February 2019, recommendation 39).
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