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govern are more simple than the natures that are governed. And it will be still more absurd if the many dæmons that rule over the parts are not connascent, but separated from each other. But you also make contrariety among them. For you speak as if "some of them were good, but others bad." Evil dæmons, however, have no where a ruling allotment, nor are they oppositely divided to such as are good with equal authority and power.
Afterwards, abandoning these particulars, you pass on to the opinion of philosophy. But you subvert the whole hypothesis concerning the peculiar dæmon. For if [as you say] "this dæmon is a part of the soul," such, for instance, as the intellectual part, "and he is happy who is in possession of a wise intellect," there will no longer be any other more excellent or dæmoniacal order, presiding over, as transcending the human soul. But certain parts of the soul, or a certain divided power, will have dominion over many of the forms of life that are in us; and will rule over these, not connascently, but as naturally exempt, and as transcending the whole of our composition.
