stituted by conformity to an external standard, is neither to suggest nor to support a distinction between truths which are, and truths which are not, self-evident; and it is this distinction that is in question and must, it seems, be surrendered.
Doubtless nothing could be intelligible, and there would be no sane reasoning, unless there were certain conditiones sine quibus non of Being and of Truth to which any and every fact and connexion of facts, and any and every reasoning, are bound to conform. And if, reflecting on this all-pervasive character of the Intelligible and of Intelligence, we formulate certain 'Laws of Thought', we are condensing into isolated judgements truth for which there is overwhelming evidence. Such judgements are 'indubitable'; for an intelligent doubt presupposes knowledge, and any and every knowledge inevitably, confirms them. But the truth which they summarily express is not comprised within their formulation. The 'evidence' for them is anywhere and everywhere, but not contained within 'themselves'.
Doubtless, also, for each special science or body of knowledge there are certain more special and concrete conditions—conditiones sine quibus non of the intelligible, quasi-individual, wholes of Space, of Number, of Life, of Political Society—conditions, therefore, to which geometrical, arithmetical, biological, political reasonings must respectively conform. And if we reflect upon the
