Page:Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, President of the United States — Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.pdf/20

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required to authorize an impeachment inquiry "has no textual support in the U.S. Constitution [or] the governing rules of the House."[1]

Furthermore, House precedent makes manifestly clear that the House need not adopt a resolution authorizing or structuring an impeachment inquiry before such an inquiry can proceed. As Jefferson's Manual notes, "[i]n the House various events have been credited with setting an impeachment in motion," including charges made on the floor, resolutions introduced by members, or "facts developed and reported by an investigating committee of the House." [2] As Chief Judge Howell explained, the House has "[i]ndisputably initiated impeachment inquiries of federal judges without a House resolution 'authorizing' the inquiry."[3] One such inquiry involved a lengthy investigation of a sitting Supreme Court Justice.[4] Indeed, several "federal judges have been impeached by the House without a House resolution 'authorizing' an inquiry."[5] For example, the Judiciary Committee investigated grounds for the impeachment of Judge Walter Nixon following a referral by the United States Judicial Conference and the introduction of a resolution for his impeachment.[6] The Committee—without any direct authorization or instruction from the full House—subsequently adopted articles of impeachment, which were approved by a vote of the full House. The Senate later voted to convict Judge Nixon and remove him from office.[7] Similar proceedings occurred in impeachments of two other judges.[8] Indeed, as recently as the 114th Congress, the Judiciary Committee considered impeachment of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service following a referral from another committee and absent a full vote of the House for an impeachment inquiry.[9]

In addition, in many prior instances in which the full House adopted resolutions authorizing and directing the Judiciary Committee to undertake impeachment inquiries, the resolutions served in part to provide the Committee with authorities it did not already have. For example, the 1974 resolution authorizing and directing the impeachment inquiry into President Nixon served to clarify the scope of the Committee's subpoena authority and authorized the Committee and its counsel to take depositions.[10] Today, the House Rules for standing committees and for HPSCI already provide these


  1. In re Rule 6(e) Application, 2019 WL 5485221, at *26.
  2. Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States, H. Doc. No. 115-177 § 603 (2019 ed.) (hereinafter "Jefferson's Manual").
  3. In re Rule 6(e) Application, 2019 WL 5485221 at *26 (providing four examples).
  4. Id. (citing 3 Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives ch. 14 § 5 (1994) (hereinafter "Deschler").
  5. In re Rule 6(e) Application, 2019 WL 5485221 at *26 (emphasis in original).
  6. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., H. Rep. No. 101-36, at 13-16 (1989).
  7. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1993).
  8. See In re Rule 6(e) Application, 2019 WL 5485221 at *26.
  9. See Examining the Allegations of Misconduct Against IRS Commissioner John Koskinen (Part I): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement by Rep. Darrell Issa describing the hearing as "an inquiry into the recommendation of impeachment" made by another committee).
  10. H. Res. 803 § 2(a)(1); see 3 Deschler ch. 14 § 6.2.

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