That view appeared repeatedly in the state ratifying debates. Delegates opined that the President could be impeached if he "deviates from his duty" or "dare[s] to abuse the power vested in him by the people."[1] In North Carolina, Iredell noted that "the person convicted [in an impeachment proceeding] is further liable to a trial at common law, and may receive such common-law punishment … if it be punishable by that law" (emphasis added).[2] Similarly, in Virginia, George Nicholas declared that the President "will be absolutely disqualified [by impeachment] to hold any place of profit, honor, or trust, and liable to further punishment if he has committed such high crimes as are punishable at common law" (emphasis added).[3] The premise underlying this statement—and Iredell's—is that some Presidential "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" were not punishable by common law.
Leading minds echoed that position through the Nation's early years. In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton argued that impeachable offenses are defined by "the abuse or violation of some public trust."[4] In that sense, he reasoned, "they are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself."[5] A few years later, Constitutional Convention delegate James Wilson reiterated Hamilton's point: "Impeachments, and offences and offenders impeachable, come not ... within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence. They are founded on different principles, are governed by different maxims, and are directed to different objects."[6] Writing in 1829, William Rawle described impeachment as reserved for "men whose treachery to their country might be productive of the most serious disasters."[7] Four years later, Justice Story emphasized that impeachable offenses ordinarily "must be examined upon very broad and comprehensive principles of public policy and duty."[8]
The American experience with impeachment confirms that lesson. A strong majority of the impeachments voted by the House since 1789 have included "one or more allegations that did not charge a violation of criminal law."[9] Several officials, moreover, have subsequently been convicted on non-criminal articles of impeachment. For example, Judge Robert Archbald was removed in 1912 for non-criminal speculation in coal properties, and Judge Halsted Ritter was removed in 1936 for the non-criminal offense of bringing his court "into scandal and disrepute."[10] As House Judiciary Committee Chairman Hatton Sumners stated explicitly during Judge Ritter's case, "We do not assume the responsibility … of proving that the respondent is guilty of a crime as that term is known to criminal
- ↑ Quoted in Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment: What Everyone Needs to Know 60 (2018).
- ↑ Staff Report on Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (1974) at 23.
- ↑ Id.
- ↑ Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 65 at 426.
- ↑ Id.
- ↑ James Wilson, Collected Works of James Wilson 736 (Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall ed. 2007).
- ↑ William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 218 (1829).
- ↑ 2 Story, Commentaries at 234.
- ↑ Staff Report on Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (1974) at 24.
- ↑ Report of the Committee on the Judicary, Robert W. Archbald, Judge of the United States Commerce Court, H. Rep No. 62-946 (1912); H. Res. 422, 74th Cong. (1936).
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