second place, it does away with trading. Thirdly, it gives opportunity for technical improvements, and consequently for new profits, which other enterprises have not got. Finally, it strengthens the productive power of the combined enterprise compared with that of others, it increases its capacity for competition in periods of depression when the fall in prices of raw materials does not keep pace with the fall in price of manufactured articles."3
The German bourgeois economist, Heymann, who has devoted a work to the description of mixed, that is, combined, enterprises in the German iron industry, says: "Single enterprises perish, crushed by the high price of raw material and the cheapness of manufactured articles." We see the following spectacle: "There remain, on the one hand, the great coal companies, producing some millions of tons yearly, strongly bound together in their syndicates, and on the other the great combined steel works, narrowly allied to the coal mines, and with their own steel syndicate. These great enterprises, producing 400,000 tons of steel per year, fabulous quantities of ore and of coal, enormous quantities of steel articles, employing 10,000 workers quartered near the factories, sometimes owning their own ports and railroads, are typical of the German iron industry. And concentration continues. Enterprises are becoming larger and larger. An ever-increasing number of enterprises, belonging to one or to several industries, are joining together in giant combines, to which half-a-dozen Berlin banks serve as supports and guides. In the German mining industry, the truth of the teaching of Karl Marx on the con-
