Page:In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation.pdf/1

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IN RE DONALD J. TRUMP CASINO SECURITIES LIT.
Cite as 7 F.3d 357 (3rd Cir. 1993)
357

dismissal of a state law claim; “If ‘saved’ from ERISA preemption, the Missouri … statute will govern the interpretation of [the] policy, but that does not affect the preemption of state law remedies by § 1132.”); Ruble v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 913 F.2d 295, 297 (6th Cir.1990) (concluding that case was removable to federal court because, “[r]egardless of how Michigan’s insurance code might have modified the terms of the … insurance policy … any action brought by a beneficiary to enforce the policy as so modified could only be brought under § 502 of ERISA….”). However, if we correctly read those cases as reaching a result contrary to the one we reach here, our preference is understandably for our own result.

We have concluded that the district court correctly determined that the New Jersey statute was not preempted by ERISA. Accordingly, the district court had supplemental, rather than original, jurisdiction over the state claim. Thus, the district court had discretion to remand the claim to state court. We reject Travelers’ argument, unsupported by caselaw, that the district court was required to determine certain choice of law issues (e.g., which state’s laws should be applied to interpret the insurance policy) before remanding the claim. Accordingly, we find no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in remanding the claim.[1]

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the proper method of review in this case is by petition for writ of mandamus. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal. We further conclude that Travelers has not established that its “right to issuance of the writ is ‘clear and indisputable.’ ” In re Pruitt, 910 F.2d 1160, 1167 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1822, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989)). Accordingly, the writ will be denied.

In re DONALD J. TRUMP CASINO SECURITIES LITIGATION—TAJ MAHAL LITIGATION.

Sidney L. KAUFMAN, suing individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated; Jerome Schwartz, suing individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated; Peter Stuyvesant, Ltd., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated; Susan Cagan; Eric Cagan; David E. Dougherty; Jean Curzio; Alexander L. Charnis; Dorothy Arkell; Fred Glossner; Herman Krangel; Robert Kloss; Helen Kloss; Fairmount Financial Corp. Joanne Gollomp; Dino Del Zotto

v.

TRUMP’S CASTLE FUNDING; Trump’s Castle Associates Limited Partnership, a New Jersey Limited Partnership; Trump Taj Mahal Funding, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation; Trump Taj Mahal Associates Limited Partnership, a New Jersey Limited Partnership; Donald J. Trump; Robert S. Trump; John O’Donnell; Nathan Katz; Tim Maland; Francisco Tejeda; Julian Menarguez; Harvey I. Freeman; Paul Henderson; Patrick C. McKoy; Edward M. Tracy; Michael S.
  1. We recognize that there might be some doubt as to whether a private plaintiff has standing to bring a cause of action in state court under the New Jersey statutes relied upon by plaintiff. See, e.g., Pierega v. Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Cos., 208 N.J.Super. 40, 504 A.2d 1200, 1204 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 104 N.J. 399, 517 A.2d 402 (1986); see also Pickett v. Lloyds, 131 N.J. 457, 621 A.2d 445, 451 (1993). However, after reviewing the pertinent caselaw and the parties’ supplemental briefing on this issue, we believe that the standing issue is not sufficiently settled to support a conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in remanding the claim.