can intimidate or corrupt a judge; and will judges appointed by it, patronised by it, and tried by it, be safe against its influence? They are placed within the power of alternate factions, lest they should be influenced by factions; and without the power of the nation, lest they should be influenced by the nation. They fear party vengeance, and cannot expect national confidence or protection. If they were responsible to the sovereignty, they would expect its protection against demagogues and factions; but if they are independent of the sovereignty, they must depend on the faction which can try and condemn them. A paper, theorelick, didactick independence cannot shield judges against the influence or corruption of a man or a faction, possessing an intimldvlung or corrupting degree of power or patronage. If the cause of the terror or treachery exists, the terror or treachery naturally and inevitably ensues. Which is the best remedy against the evil; to create the cause, and to underwrite the "judges shall be independent of this cause of terror or corruption," or to forbear to create it? If the national confidence and protection through the medium of responsibility is added to this forbearance, it is probable, that judicial integrity, the object in quest, will be well secured. If a liability to impeachment is a security for this integrity, why is it not exclusively relied on to produce legislative integrity? If a responsibility to the sovereign power, exposes integrity to the influence of an individual or a faction, why is the legislature thus exposed?
A deviation from one principle is the road leading to another. Being taught that the insubordination of judicial power, will wash away human vices and passions, and that national opinion will corrupt it; mo shall no longer consider this opinion as the most incorruptible species of political jury, and the only safe guardian of liberty and property. And our respect fur the basis of our policy being once weakened, it will be gradually undermined, by diminishing the responsibility of legislative and executive power, until we
