"The executive power cannot be well managed by a representative assembly, for want of two essential qualities,
secrecy and dispatch."
"Such an assembly is still less qualified to exercise the judicial power, because it is too numerous, too slow, and generally too little skilled in the laws."
"But shall the whole legislative power be left in the hands of such an assembly? The three first at least of the foregoing reasons, will shew that the legislative power ought not to be wholly intrusted to one assembly."
"Let the representative body then elect, from among themselves or their constituents, or both, a distinct assembly, which we will call a council. It may consist of any number you please, say twenty or thirty. To this assembly should be given a free and independent exercise of its judgement, upon all acts of legislation, that it may be able to check and correct the errours of the other."
"But there ought to be a third branch of the legislature and wherever the executive power of the state is placed, there the third branch of the legislature ought to be found."
"Let the two houses then by joint ballot choose a governour. Let him be chosen annually. Divest him of most of those badges of slavery called prerogatives. And give him a negative upon the legislature. This I know is liable to some objections, to obviate which, you may make him in a legislative capacity only president of the council. But if he is annually elective, you need not scruple to give him a free and independent exercise of his judgement, for he will have so great an affection for the people, the representatives and council, that he would seldom exercise this right, except in cases, the publick utility of which would soon be manifest, and some such cases would happen."
"In the present exigency of American affairs, when by an act of parliament we are put out of the royal protection,
