Page:Interim Staff Report on Investigation into Risky MPXV Experiment at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.pdf/17

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Prior to March 19, 2024, HHS and the NIH made numerous statements that such a gene transfer had not been formally proposed and omitted any mention that the IBC had, in fact, approved a gene transfer in the direction from clade I to clade II, not just in the direction of clade II to clade I. This deception appears to be part of a systematic effort by HHS and the NIH to delay and obstruct the Committee’s lawful investigation into NIAID’s risky research that could raise concerns about the agencies’ management of GOFROC and DURC. HHS continues to maintain that, despite receiving approval, Dr. Moss decided not to conduct gene transfer research from clade I to clade II. The Committee continues to request documents from HHS that support this assertion.

To conduct effective oversight, it is imperative that Congress be able to gather facts. Deception and obstruction interfere with this constitutional responsibility.[1] Further, NIH employees swear an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.[2] Their ultimate loyalty is to the Constitution, not the Executive Branch. Thus, to fulfill their oaths, NIH employees have an obligation to tell the truth to Congress, the representatives of the American people, which has the implied oversight responsibility attached to the explicit Article I Section 8 legislative authority in the Constitution.

The MPXV research proposal has become a case study about how the NIH, and particularly NIAID, oversees and accounts for the monitoring of potentially dangerous GOFROC research. It is particularly relevant as the Biden administration has just issued its new “policy for oversight of dual use research of concern and pathogens with enhanced pandemic potential” and related implementation guidance, which largely leave funding agencies, like NIAID, in charge of approval and oversight of potentially risky research they fund.[3]

The pattern of HHS and NIH misrepresentations to the Committee leaves open at least two possibilities: the officials at HHS who repeatedly denied that a MPXV experiment was ever formally submitted or approved were knowingly making material misrepresentations to Congress, or these officials were misled by the individuals who


  1. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
  2. See, e.g., U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Appointment Affidavits, Form SF-61 (revised August 2002) (on file with Committee).
  3. A research study similar to the Moss experiment as discussed in the September 15, 2022, Science article was featured as an example in the Implementation Guidance for the United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential 69 (May 6, 2024), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/USG-DURC-PEPP-Implementation-Guidance.pdf.

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