Page:Interim Staff Report on Investigation into Risky MPXV Experiment at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.pdf/30

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

and lack of full cooperation undermines public trust in the NIH. The stubborn refusal to provide basic information about research of public concern warrants significant action by Congress to enhance oversight and control over NIH’s risky activities.

Ultimately, this investigation and interim report underscore the importance of restoring public trust in our government health agencies as well as Congress reasserting its Article I authority. Transparency and accountability are the most pressing remedies.

Outstanding Questions

Two sets of major outstanding factual questions in this investigation remain.

The first set of outstanding questions relate to the MPXV experiments:

  • Despite denials, did the Moss team, in fact, perform some or all of the proposed and approved experiments transferring genes from clade I to clade II (either clade IIa or IIb)?
  • Does the NIH/NIAID leadership exercise sufficient oversight of its GOFROC/DURC research and researchers to be able to state with confidence whether or not such experiments were performed?

The second set of outstanding questions relate to the materially misleading and potentially false representations to the Committee by HHS, the NIH, and NIAID:

  • If the experiments were not performed, why would HHS and the NIH/NIAID go to such great lengths to mislead the Committee about an approval for experiment that never occurred?
  • Does this misleading and obstructive conduct merit holding the persons responsible in contempt of Congress or referral to the Department of Justice for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and/or 31 U.S.C. § 3729?

Interim Findings and Recommendations

Despite these unresolved questions, the Committee can make the following interim findings and recommendations:

30