Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/19

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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. (U) By order of General George B. Crist, USMC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, dated 3 July 1988, Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty, USN, Director, Policy and Plans (J-5), U.S. Central Command, was appointed to conduct a formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the downing of a commercial airliner by the USS VINCENNES on 3 July 1988.

2. (U) The formal investigation was conducted at the Administrative Support Unit, Bahrain, with preliminary interviews and information gathering conducted by the investigating team on board USS VINCENNES (CG 49), USS ELMER MONTGOMERY (FF 1082), USS SIDES (FFG 14), and USS CORONADO (AGF 11), flagship for Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East (CJTFME).

3. (U) Rear Admiral Fogarty, and an investigating team composed of five officers, arrived in Bahrain on the evening of 5 July 1988. Brief summaries of the service assignments of the team members are provided at enclosure (19). Preliminary interviews began on board participating units on 6 July 1988. Two additional investigating team members arrived 9/10 July 1988, one by way of Commander, Seventh Fleet, where he gathered information on the USS VINCENNES pre-deployment training. CJTFME,  ; USS VINCENNES Commanding Officer, CAPT W. Rogers, USN; USS VINCENNES Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (FAAWC),  ; and USS VINCENNES Tactical Action Officer (TAO),  , were designated as parties to the investigation. Formal hearings began on 13 July 1988 and closed on the afternoon of 19 July 1988.

4. (U) The investigation inquired into all the events which occurred prior to, during, and immediately following the engagement of Track Number (TN) 4131, later identified as Iran Air Flight 655. This designation of TN 4131 is used interchangeably with Iran Air Flight 655 throughout the investigation. There were specific, technically complex issues that required the Investigating Officer to call upon the professional expertise of the Commander, Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC), Dahlgren, and NAVSEA (PMS-400) personnel. The USS VINCENNES data recording tapes were hand delivered under chain-of-custody immediately following the incident to NSWC Dahlgren. After initial data reduction in the United States, technical representatives from NWSC Dahlgren, led by  , AEGIS Program Office, and NAVSEA (PMS-400) representatives came to Bahrain and provided further analysis on the following matters:

  1. AEGIS Weapon System Mark 7 performance and operation;
  2. Performance and operation of the AN/SPY-1A radar;
  3. Operation and message content in Link 11;

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