the eldest has to pay the others their share of the father's beneficial interest; and the competition price is their standard of valuation.[1] Consequently the permanent tenant finds himself in the same position as if he had bought the farm from a stranger:—that is to say, destitute of capital and probably in debt:—while the brothers walk off with a sum of money which if the rent is as fair as the theory of the arrangement pre-supposes, can represent no real value,[2] and to which therefore they have much less right than the landlord,
- ↑
Evidence of Robert Smith, Esq. Clerk of the Peace.
"In my opinion, such is the anxiety of the majority of the lower class of farmers, in the districts wherein I am best acquainted, that they would purchase the outgoing tenant's interest, disregarding all covenants." Dig. Dev. Com. Summary, p. 295.
Evidence of John Hancock, Esq., Agent.
"The number of competitors have a still greater effect. The demand, in general, regulates the price."—Ibid. p. 295.
Evidence of John Andrews, Farmer and Agent.
"I think land, being sold at a high price by the outgoing tenant, takes away capital that ought to be left with the incoming tenant, for there is such eagerness to get land, that a man will give all he has got in the land, and leave himself without capital."—Ibid. p. 295.
- ↑
Evidence of Mr. John Wilkin, Farmer.
"With regard to the purchase of land, I may say, generally, that so much is not given for the land now; but where there is an anxiety to provide a place for a man's family to set down upon, in many cases the money is borrowed, and not repaid till it is sold again, so that it is a fictitious value."—Ibid. p. 305.
Evidence of Mr. Robert Macrea, Farmer.
"In the case of a farm that has been improved by the tenant, does it sell proportionably higher than one that has not
