Hayne J
Bell J
54.
HAYNE AND BELL JJ. The facts and circumstances which give rise to these two proceedings and the relevant provisions of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ("the TPP Act") are set out in the reasons of other members of the Court and need not be repeated. We agree that orders should be made in these matters in the form proposed by Gummow J.
It is as well to identify the central elements of the case advanced by the plaintiffs and other tobacco companies that intervened in the proceedings and the principles that must be applied. When that is done, it is evident that the determinative question is shortly stated and readily answered.
The TPP Act seeks to reduce the sales of tobacco products. It prohibits the use of the intellectual property (copyright, designs, patents and trade marks) that the tobacco companies would otherwise use to help sell their products. The tobacco companies say that, if the TPP Act operates according to its terms, it will reduce their sales and that their businesses will therefore be less valuable. They also say that the TPP Act will adversely affect the value of their intellectual property, which could have been turned to account by assignment or licence. Doing so after the TPP Act comes into force will bring, if anything, a very greatly reduced price.
The tobacco companies' central complaint in these proceedings is that the TPP Act prohibits them from using their intellectual property in or on their retail packaging in the way in which they have used it, and would wish to continue to use it, to promote the sale of their products. They say that it follows that the TPP Act will take their property. On the face of it, that proposition seems hard to deny, but its accuracy need not be examined. It need not be examined because the relevant constitutional question is whether there has been an acquisition of property, not whether there has been a taking. Even assuming that the TPP Act effects a "taking", these reasons will show that there is no acquisition.
Fundamental principles
As was most recently pointed out in Wurridjal v The Commonwealth[1], the relationship between constitutional provisions which forbid or restrain some legislative course and others which appear to permit that course without restraint is a subject of importance beyond s 51(xxxi)[2]. It is important to recognise that
