Bell J
58.
Cases like Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel[1], and those which have followed, show that in considering whether there has been an acquisition of property within s 51(xxxi) the focus of attention must fall upon identification of a legal interest in, or legal relation with, some subject matter. In Dalziel the impugned provisions gave the Commonwealth possession of land to the exclusion of a weekly tenant. In Bank of NSW v The Commonwealth[2] the impugned provisions gave the Commonwealth control of a banking company to the exclusion of its shareholders by giving the Commonwealth control over the bank's board of directors. In Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation[3] a right of action (a property right) was taken away and, as a result, the party otherwise liable to action obtained a defence to the claim akin to a release from liability. In Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth[4] a right to mine minerals from land vested in the Commonwealth was extinguished and, as a result, the Commonwealth's interest in the land was freed from the previously existing right to mine.
It may not be possible, and it is certainly not appropriate, to attempt to chart the boundaries of what is meant in s 51(xxxi) by "property". It is important, however, to notice that it has long been recognised[5] that "property" is used sometimes to indicate the tangible or intangible object to which legal rights or privileges relate, and sometimes to denote the legal interest, or aggregate of legal relations, pertaining to that object. The way in which the tobacco companies formulated their arguments – by focusing upon what was said to be the "use" or "control" of retail packaging by the Commonwealth to convey its health messages – directs attention to whether the Commonwealth, by reason of the TPP Act, acquires any legal interest in or legal relation with the packaging that is an interest or relation the law would label as "property".
- ↑ (1944) 68 CLR 261.
- ↑ (1948) 76 CLR 1.
- ↑ (1994) 179 CLR 297.
- ↑ (1997) 190 CLR 513; [1997] HCA 38.
- ↑ Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning", (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16 at 21–22; see also Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 at 365–366 [17]–[18], 388–389 [85]–[86]; [1999] HCA 53.
