Page:JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia.pdf/72

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Hayne J
Bell J

62.

Conclusion

The TPP Act is not a law by which the Commonwealth acquires any "interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it may be"[1]. The TPP Act is not a law with respect to the acquisition of property. It is therefore not necessary to consider the Commonwealth's attempt to articulate a principle which would set legislation effecting an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms beyond the reach of s 51(xxxi) on the ground that the legislation is a reasonable regulation of some activity for the greater good of society. The arguments advanced by the tobacco companies are answered by the logically anterior conclusion that the TPP Act effects no acquisition of property.

One further point should be made. It is unsurprising that much of the argument in the present cases, as in other recent cases about s 51(xxxi), proceeded by taking statements made in earlier decisions and fusing them into a proposition from which it was said to follow that there was or was not an acquisition of property without just terms. It must be emphasised, however, that it would be wrong to take what has been said in earlier decisions, or in these reasons, and divorce the statement from the context in which it appears. Above all, it must be recognised that it is the constitutional text and the cardinal principles that emerge from that text to which attention must always be given.

In the present cases, the tobacco companies argued that the Commonwealth acquired the use of, or control over, the retail packaging in which tobacco will be sold to convey health messages. Framing the argument in that way necessarily drew attention to an understanding of property that places in the foreground the identification of the interest in the tangible or intangible object in question and the legal relation which should be described as "property" between that object and the person alleged to have acquired "property". Other cases, perhaps many other cases, may require the same kind of analysis. But there may be cases in which an analysis of that kind will not be helpful. It is the constitutional text and the fundamental principles based on that text which must guide consideration of the issue.


  1. The Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 145 per Mason J.