Page:JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia.pdf/96

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Crennan J

86.

Other rights of registered owners and applicants under the Trade Marks Act, the exercise of which might be in doubt as a result of the Packaging Act, are expressly preserved. The right of an applicant under s 68 of the Trade Marks Act to have a qualifying application registered, in the absence of opposition, is preserved by s 28(1) and (3)(c) of the Packaging Act. Section 28(2) provides that the Packaging Act does not have the effect that compliant use of a trade mark in relation to tobacco products would be "contrary to law", a characteristic which would result in the rejection of an application for registration under s 42(b) of the Trade Marks Act. Section 28(3) provides that the operation of the Packaging Act does not make it reasonable or appropriate for the Registrar of Trade Marks not to register a trade mark, or to register a trade mark subject to limitations or conditions, or to revoke either acceptance of an application for, or a registration of, a trade mark.

Further, the registered design for a "ribbed package" and the patent granted in respect of an opening which can be resealed, both claimed in the BAT proceeding, cannot be respectively applied or exploited in retail tobacco packaging because of the prohibition on decorative embellishments on packaging and the prohibition on openings which can be resealed[1]. It should be noted that the ribbed packaging and the resealable opening, the subject of the registered design and patent in the BAT proceeding, were part of the product get-up of a cigarette package upon which the brand name "Dunhill" appeared. For that reason, submissions focused mainly on the plaintiffs' rights and interests under the Trade Marks Act and in product get-up as protected by the common law. That emphasis is reflected in these reasons.

Section 15 of the Packaging Act deals with the scope of the operation of that Act having regard to s 51(xxxi), and s 15(2) (set out in other reasons) reverses the presumption that the Packaging Act is to operate as a whole: the legislative intention is to be taken to be that the enactment should be divisible so that any parts found to be constitutionally unobjectionable should be carried into effect independently of those provisions found to be constitutionally objectionable[2].

In essence, the plaintiffs have two complaints. The first is that, on commencement, the Packaging Act's restrictions will render them unable to exploit their claimed property, especially their trade marks and product get-up, in connection with the sale of cigarettes in any meaningful or substantive way. The second complaint is that the Packaging Act's restrictions have extinguished the


  1. Packaging Act, s 18(1)(a); Regulations, reg 2.1.1(2).
  2. See Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth ("the Banking Case") (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 371 per Dixon J; [1948] HCA 7.