open. For this purpose, it dispatched a considerable naval force under Commodore Matthew C. Perry. Perry steamed into Tokyo Bay in July 1853. After delivering a letter from the President of the United States to the ruler of Japan, demanding the inauguration of trade relations, he withdrew to the Ryukyu Islands for the winter, with the promise that he would return early the next year to receive a reply.
Edo was thrown into a state of complete confusion over this sudden crisis. The Japanese were appalled by the size and guns of the American “black ships,” as they called them, and they were amazed by the steam-powered vessels which moved up the bay against the wind. They realized that their own shore batteries were almost useless against the American warships, before which Edo, too, lay defenseless.
The government split into two factions—conservatives who blindly advocated the expulsion of the foreigners, and realists who saw that Japan could do nothing but bow to American demands. In their own indecision, the Edo authorities did a most unusual thing. For the first time in over 600 years of military rule, the Shogun’s government asked the opinion of the emperor on an important problem of state and invited counsel also from the Daimyo. Conservative Kyoto and the Daimyo of the land were of course strongly in favor of expelling the foreigners.
The Edo government was indeed caught on the horns of a dilemma when Perry’s fleet returned to Tokyo Bay in February 1854. The emperor and the nation as a whole demanded a policy which Edo was quite incapable of carrying out. Under the threatening