Abraham ibn Daud Abraham ben David
THE
.lEWISII
like Aristotle iiml bis Arabic ititerjirotors. prorecding from the priuciplc of niolion, and l)asiii,ir his argu-
ment upon the proof of the impossi-
His Doc-
bility of a rrf/niaiis iit iiijiiiitum. arrives at the conception of a First Cause
trine of
of all motion, or of a Prime Mover, who Himself, as First Cause, can not have any other cause of motion above Him. and must, The Prime therefore, be thoujrht of as motionless. Mover is God. Hut this proof of the existence of God leaves still open two important ([uestions relating to the truth of our knowledge of God: one concerning the incorporealitj-, and the other respecting the unity of God. As to theincorporeality of God, it follows logically from the notion of intinity which belongs to the First Cause of motion that no corporeal thing can be intinite itself: nor can infinite force be attributed to it. But the Prime Mover is infinite for. since He Himself is without motion. His force also remains unalTected by the motion of cliange and transformation. Therefore the Prime Mover— that is, God can not be corporeal (i/i. p, 47: German trans., p, 60), But as a being of neees.saiy existence, God must also be absolutely simjile and single; inasmuch as the conception of a plurality in His essence would, at the same time, nullify the notion of the necessity of His existence. For the consolidation of this plurality into a unity must have been etVected by another being different from itself hence the existence of this plural being would be no more necessary, that is, determined by its own essence, but woidd be dependent upon that other being which brought about the unification {lb. p. 49: German trans,, p. 63). From the notion of absolute unity results the conception of the uniqueness of God; for if two beings of this kind could exist, the unity of God would be nullified, since to one, at least, of the tmils a S|)ecial character must be attributed so as to distinguish it from the other (ib.). With the doctrine of the unity of God is connected the doctrine of the divine altribute.s, which is preceded in Abraham ibn Daud's system by the doctrine of the negative attributes, already accepted liy Bahva ibn Pakuda
God.
—
("Ilobot ha (Cuzari,
ii.
i, 10) and by.Iudah ha-Levi from the older Arabic theology. Ac-
Leiiiibot,
2)
cording to Ibn Daiui, only negative attributes, in the strict and proper sense, can be imputed to God; so that, whatever multiplicity of these negative attributes may be ascribed to Him, no nuiltiplicity in the essence of God can result. Certainly this is equivalent to a renunciation of a positive conception of the Divine Being; for negative statements may suffice to prevent erroneous ideas, but a positive knowledge can never be obtained through them alone (ib. p. .5; German tran.s.. p. 6.5), Indeed, our whole
knowledge of God that He exists and
is
limited to two certainties, (1) that His es.sence is incompre-
(2)
hensible (i'4. p, .56; German trans,, p, 71), Inaddition to the negative attributes, only relative attributes can be predicated of God for even these latter, how many soever may be a.ssumed, since they do not apply to the essence of God but only to Ilis relation to the world, produce no modification in the notion of the unity of the Divine Being (ib. p. .54; German
trans,, p. 69).
From the speculative doctrines of faith, the truth of which can be proved only by reasoning, are to be distinguished the historical dogmas whose authenticity is based principally upon divine revelation, or. to speak more exactly, upon the historical tradition of such a revelation {ib. p. 69; German trans., p, 87), The tradition concerning an event that is reported to have taken place publicly before a great body of
ENCYCLOPEDIA
102
men. which originated, so lo say, under the control of public opinion, without having been disputeil by contemporaries, and has descended with an uninterruptecl continuity, possesses an argumentativeness which can not be controverted even by the professional logician (ib. pp. 78, 81; German trans, pp, 98, l(i;}). The trustworthiness of historical tradition forms a presmnption in favor of the truth of prophecy. In the true sense of the word, according to the axioms eslablisshed above for the reliability of historical tradition, there can be only as.sertion of real prophecy when the divine revelations ap|)ly lo important public matters: while tlio.se revelations which pertain to less important matters, or even to the personal affairs of a single individual, can not be classed undertliishead((Vi, p,71 ;Germantrans., p. 89), Thus, as Ibn Daud remarks, jierhaps witha reference to the miracles attributed to .lesus, the authenticity of the Torah would be in a sorry plight if, instead of being based on miracles of real historic certjiinty, such as those of Jloses, it were supported merely by miracles of such private character as the resurrections effected by Elijah and Elisha(i6, p. 80; German trans., p, 101).
Relying upon the doctrines of Alfarabi and of Ibn Daud, whom Maimonides follows in many wa.vs in his conception of prophecy, further sets forth that the gift of prophecy must His Theory not be considered as a phenomenon, of Prophecy, interruiiting the continuitj' of the development of the human mind, but ia a certain sense as the final stage of a natural evolution whose lower pha.ses, though they must be distinguished from prophecy proper, arc nevertheless connected with the same faculty through a certain identity of nature. And even if the true stage of prophecy is reached, this gift is, nevertheless, still capable of progressive dev(lo]iment. although it may exceptionally at once reach the highest perfection in Sina. Ibn
particularly gifted individuals. The connection between the mind of the prophet and the higher intellects, principally with the Active Intelligence, furnishes a sulHcient explanation of the higher cognitive faculty of the jirophet, as well as of his power of transcending natural law. .p-
pointed to become an intermediary between God and man, the prophet is elevated almost to the plane of the separated intelligences, or angels (ib. p. 7:J; Ger-
man
trans,, p. 91).
Based upon the philosophical system developed above, and after the exposition of the doctrine of faith, the problem of human free-will and its relation to faith in a divine providence. or iiredcslination. may be regarded as tination. much nearer its solution. The ol)jection that faith in a divine provi<l(nce is inconsistent with the existence of evil in the world, because God can not be the author of evil and good at the same time, is refute<l by the fact that evil has no existence in il.self, but is only the natural result of the ab.sence of actual ,irood, and that, consequenlly, evil needs no creator. The defects and imperfections which appear in this world are in nowise contradictory to the wisdom and goodness of God, The defects appear only to a finite conception which considers things separately and in themselves, and not in their connection with the whole. Viewed from a higher standpoint the imperfections adhering to things or individuals would perhaps, in their relation to the whole, even prove to be iierfections and advantages ((*. p, 9.5; German trans., p. 121), The human free-will as a subjective principle has for its objective correlate the notion of possibility,
On Predes-
by which one
of
two
alternatives
may
occur.
This
