ſhort of perfection, by giving the choice of ſome militia officers, &c. to the people—theſe are however ſmall matters at preſent. They have not made their firſt magiſtrates hereditary, nor their ſenators: here they differ from the Engliſh conſtitution, and with great propriety.
The Agrarian in America, is divided into the hands of the common people in every ſtate, in ſuch a manner, that nineteen twentieths of the property would be in the hands of the commons, let them appoint whom they could for chief magiſtrate and ſenators: the ſovereignty then, in fact, as well as morality, muſt reſide in the whole body of the people; and an hereditary king and nobility, who ſhould not govern according to the public opinion, would infallibly be tumbled inſtantly from their places: it is not only moſt prudent then, but abſolutely neceflary, to avoid continual violence, to give the people a legal, conſtitutional, and peaceable mode of changing theſe rulers, whenever they diſcover improper principles or diſpoſitions in them. In the preſent ſtate of ſociety, and with the preſent manners, this may be done, not only without inconvenience, but greatly for the happineſs and proſperity of the country. In future ages, if the preſent ſtates become great nations, rich, powerful, and luxurious, as well as numerous, their own feelings and good ſenſe will dictate to them what to do: they may make tranſitions to a nearer reſemblance of the Britiſh conſtitution, by a freſh convention, without the ſmalleſt interruption to liberty. But this will never become neceſſary, until great quantities of property ſhall get into few hands.
The truth is, that the people have ever governed in America: all the weight of the royal governors and councils, even backed with fleets
