Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/11

executive from the legiſlative power, and of the judicial from both—and a balance in the legiſlature, by three independent, equal branches—are perhaps the three only diſcoveries in the conſtitution of a free government, ſince the inſtitution of Lycurgus, Even theſe have been ſo unfortunate, that they have never ſpread: the firſt has been given up by all the nations, excepting one, who had once adopted it; and the other two, reduced to practice, if not invented, by the Engliſh nation, have never been imitated by any other except their own deſcendants in America. While it would be raſh to ſay, that nothing further can be done to bring a free government, in all its parts, ſtill nearer to perfection—the repreſentations of the people are moſt obviouſly ſuſceptible of improvement. The end to be aimed at, in the formation of a repreſentative aſſembly, ſeems to be the ſenſe of the people, the public voice: the perfection of the portrait conſiſts in its likeneſs. Numbers, or property, or both, ſhould be the rule; and the proportions of electors and members an affair of calculation. The duration ſhould not be ſo long that the deputy ſhould have time to forget the opinions of his conſtituents. Corruption in elections is the great enemy of freedom. Among the proviſions to prevent it, more frequent elections, and a more general privilege of voting, are not all that might be deviſſed. Dividing the diſtricts, diminiſhing the diſtance of travel, and confining the choice to reſidents, would be great advances

towards,