Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/137

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
Dr Swift.
99

hundred, and diſpoſing the magiſtracies and offices according to men's eſtates, leaving to the multitude their votes in electing, and the power of judging certain proceſſes by appeal. This council of four hundred was choſen, one hundred out of each tribe, and ſeems to have been a body repreſentative of the people, though the people collective reſerved a ſhare of power to themſelves.

In all free ſtates, the evil to be avoided is tyranny; that is to ſay, the ſumma imperii, or unlimited power, ſolely in the hands of the one, the few, or the many. Though we cannot prolong the period of a commonwealth beyond the decree of heaven, or the date of its nature, any more than human life beyond the ſtrength of the ſeminal virtue; yet we may manage a ſickly conſtitution, and preſerve a ſtrong one; we may watch, and prevent accidents; we may turn off a great blow from without, and purge away an ill humour that is lurking within; and render a ſtate long lived, though not immortal. Some phyſicians have thought, that if it were practicable to keep the ſeveral humours of the body in an exact balance of each with its oppoſite, it might be immortal; and ſo perhaps would a political body, if the balance of power could be always held exactly even.

All independent bodies of men ſeem naturally to divide into the three powers, of the one, the few, and the many. A free people met together, as ſoon as they fall into any acts of civil ſocietv, do of themſelves divide into three ranks. The firſt is, that of ſome one eminent ſpirit, who, having ſignalized his valour and fortune in defence of his country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence

on