"juſt idea of liberty, and ſhewn the falſity, ſo often repeated by almoſt all republican writers, that liberty conſiſts in being ſubject only to the laws."
I ſhall chearfully agree with Mr. Turgot, that it is very poſſible that laws, and even equal laws made by common conſent, may deprive the minority of the citizens of their rights. A ſociety, by a majority, may govern itſelf, even by equal laws, that is by laws to which all, majority and minority, are equally ſubjeft, ſo as to oppreſs the minority. It may eſtabliſh an uniformity in religion; it may reſtrain trade; it may confine perſonal liberty of all equally, and againſt the judgment of many, even of the beſt and wiſeſt, without reaſonable motives, uſe, or benefit. We may go farther, and ſay, that a nation may be unanimous in conſenting to a law reſtraining their natural liberty, property, and commerce, and their moral and religious liberties too, to a degree that may be prejudicial to the nation and every individual in it. A nation of Catholics might unanimouſly conſent to prohibit labour upon one half the days in the year, as feaſt days. The whole American nation might unanimouſly conſent to a Sunday law, and a warden act, which ſhould deprive them of the uſe of their limbs one day in ſeven. A nation may unanimouſly agree to a navigation act, which ſhould ſhackle the commerce of all. Yet Dr. Price's definition of civil liberty is as liable to this objection as any other. Theſe would all be equal laws, made with common conſent: theſe would all be acts of legitimate government. To take in Mr, Turgot's idea, then, we muſt add to Dr. Price's ideas of equal laws by common conſent, this other—for the general intereſt, or the public good. But it is generally ſuppoſed, that
