Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/176

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138
Ancient Republics, &c.

"ſembly or council chooſing ſhould conſiſt of the intereſt of the commonwealth; as the wiſdom of the commonwealth is in the ariſtocracy, ſo the intereſt of the commonwealth is in the whole body of the people: and whereas this, in caſe the commonwealth conſiſts of a whole nation, is too unwieldy a body to be aſſembled, this council is to conſiſt of ſuch a repreſentative as may be equal, and ſo conſtituted as it can never contract any other intereſt than that of the whole people. But, in the preſent caſe, the ſix dividing, and the fourteen chooſing, muſt of neceſſity take in the whole intereſt of the twenty. Dividing and chooſing, in the language of a commonwealth, is debating and reſolving; and whatever, upon debate of the ſenate, is propoſed to the people, and reſolved by them, is enacted by the authority of the fathers, and by the power of the people—auctoritate patrum et juſſu populi; which concurring, make a law."

Upon theſe principles, and to eſtabliſh a method of enacting laws that muſt of neceſſity be wiſe and equal, the people of moſt of the United States of America agreed upon that diviſion of the legiſlative power into two houſes, the houſe of repreſentatives and the ſenate, which has given ſo much diſguſt to Mr. Turgot. Harrington will ſhew us, equally well, the propriety and neceſſity of the other branch, the governor: but before we proceed to that, it may be worth while to obſerve the ſimilitude between this paſſage, and ſome of thoſe ſentiments and expreſſions of Swift, which were quoted in a former letter; and there is in the Idea of a Patriot King, written by his friend Lord Bolingbroke, a paſſage to the ſame purpoſe, ſo nobly expreſſed, that I cannot forbear the pleaſure of tran-

ſcribing