Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/21

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Preface.
xiii

words, without ſeparating the executive power from the legiſlative. If the executive power, or any conſiderable part of it, is left in the hands either of an ariſtocratical or a democratical aſſembly, it will corrupt the legiſlature as neceſſarily as ruſt corrupts iron, or as arſenic poiſons the human body; and when the legiſlature is corrupted the people are undone.

The rich, the well-born, and the able, acquire an influence among the people, that will ſoon be too much for ſimple honeſty and plain ſenſe, in a houſe of repreſentatives. The moſt illuſtrious of them muſt therefore be ſeparated from the maſs, and placed by themſelves in a ſenate: this is, to all honeſt and uſeful intents, an oſtraciſm. A member of a ſenate, of immenſe wealth, the moſt reſpected birth, and tranſcendent abilities, has no influence in the nation, in compariſon of what he would have in a ſingle repreſentative aſſembly. When a ſenate exiſts, the moſt powerful man in the ſtate may be ſafely admitted into the houſe of repreſentatives, becauſe the people have it in their power to remove him into the ſenate as ſoon as his influence becomes dangerous. The ſenate becomes the great object of ambition; and the richeſt and the moſt ſagacious wiſh to merit an advancement to it by ſervices to the public in the houſe. When he has obtained the object of his wiſhes, you may ſtill hope for the benefits of his exertions, without dreading his paſſions;

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