conſuls, ſenate, and people, had been centered in a ſingle aſſembly of the people, collectively or repreſentatively, will any man pretend to believe that they would have been long free, or ever great?
The diſtribution of power was however never accurately or judiciouſly made in that conſtitution: the executive was never ſufficiently ſeparated from the legiſlative, nor had theſe powers a controul upon each other defined with ſufficient accuracy: the executive had not power to interpoſe and decide between the people and the ſenate.
As we advance in this correſpondence, we may ſee cauſe to differ widely from the judgment of Polybius, "that it is impoſſible to invent a more perfect ſyſtem of government." We may be convinced that the conſtitution of England, if its balance is ſeen to play, in practice, according to the principles of its theory—that is to ſay, if the people are fairly and fully repreſented, ſo as to have the power of dividing or chooſing, of drawing up hill or down, inſtead of being diſpoſed of by a few lords—is a ſyſtem much more perfect. The conſtitutions of ſeveral of the United States, it is hoped, will prove themſelves improvements, both upon the Roman, the Spartan, and the Engliſh commonwealths.
