Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/240

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Ancient Republics, &c.

thoſe who mount up to tyranny invent the celebrated tyrannical demand of the people, certain guards for their perſons, that the aſſiſtance of the people may be ſecured to them. The people, afraid of his ſafety, but ſecure as to their own, grant them. Then thoſe who have ſubſtance, and the crime of hating the people, fly; and if any one of them is caught, he is put to death. This preſident of a city, thus not behaving like a truely great man, tumbles down many others, and ſits in his chair a conſummate tyrant, inſtead of a preſident of the city. Conſider now the happineſs of the man and the city in which ſuch a mortal ariſes: in the firſt days, he ſmiles, and ſalutes every one he meets, ſays he is no tyrant, promiſes many things, both in private and in public, frees from debts, diſtributes lands, both to the people in general and thoſe about him, affects to be mild and of the patriot ſpirit towards all. But when he has reconciled to himſelf ſome of his foreign enemies, and tranquillity is reſtored, he raiſes wars, that the people may want a leader, and that, being rendered poor by the payment of taxes, they may be under a neceſſity of becoming intent on a daily ſuſtenance, and leſs ready to conſpire againſt him. If he ſuſpects any of them, who are of free ſpirits, will not allow him to govern, in order to have ſome pretext for deſtroying them, he expoſes them to the enemy. On theſe accounts, a tyrant is always under a neceſſity of raiſing war. While he is doing theſe things, he muſt become more hateful to his citizens: ſome of thoſe who have been promoted along with him, and are in power, ſpeak but freely, both to him and among themſelves, finding fault with the tranſactions. It behoves the tyrant then to cut off all thoſe who are of a more manly ſpirit, if he means to govern, till he leave

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