ing may reſtrain it. If the regal authority preſumes too far, he muſt appeal to the other two. Without three diviſions of power, ſtationed to watch each other, and compare each other's conduct with the laws, it will be impoſſible that the laws ſhould at all times preſerve their authority, and govern all men.
Plato has ſufficiently aſſerted the honour of the laws, and the neceſſity of proper guardians of them; but has no where delineated the various orders of guardians, and the neceſſity of a balance between them: he has, nevertheleſs, given us premiſes from whence the abſolute neceſſity of ſuch orders and equipoiſes may be inferred; he has ſhewn how naturally every ſimple ſpecies of government degenerates. The ariſtocracy, or ambitious republic, becomes immediately an oligarchy—What ſhall be done to prevent it? Place two guardians of the laws to watch the ariſtocracy: one, in the ſhape of a king, on one ſide of it; another, in the ſhape of a democratical aſſembly, on the other ſide. The ariſtocracy, become an oligarchy, changes into a democracy—How ſhall it be prevented? By giving the natural ariſtocracy in ſociety its rational and juſt weight, and by giving it a regal power to appeal to, againſt the madneſs of the people. Democracy becomes a tyranny—How ſhall this be prevented? By giving it an able independent ally in an ariſtocratical aſſembly, with whom it may unite againſt the unjuſt and illegal deſigns of any one man.
