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MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

Division, each agreed to maintain a division; Tennessee organized the 30th Armored Division, while North Carolina organized the 30th Infantry Division.[1]

In 1955 Congress again legislated measures to improve the reserves. Among the amendments to the 1952 law was a provision that allowed young men eighteen and a half years old to enlist in the Army Reserve for eight years. Not less than three and not more than six months of that obligation was to be spent on active duty for basic training. The law also provided that reservists who did not perform satisfactorily after basic training might be ordered, without their consent, to active duty not to exceed forty-five days. Although the Army Reserve hoped these provisions would help to meet manning problems, the measure failed. Most young men were uninterested in military service, and for the few who were the active Army lacked the resources to provide basic training and the National Guard proved more attractive than the Army Reserve.[2]

At the beginning of 1957 the Army thus had 56 combat divisions and 12 training divisions. Of these, the Regular Army fielded 18 combat divisions, many not fully manned; the National Guard 27; and the Army Reserve 11. Of the 56 divisions, 3 were airborne, 10 were armored, and the remainder were infantry.

Between 1950 and 1957 Army divisions fought a war in Korea and deterred the Soviet challenge in Western Europe. At the height of the Korean War the active Army had eight divisions in the Far East, five in Germany, and a seven division General Reserve in the United States. Divisions retained their World War II structure with modifications while gaining additional firepower. As the United States assumed leadership of the Western democracies, a ready force, backed by fully manned and equipped reserves, took on added significance. Nevertheless, the Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve divisions all suffered from a lack of personnel. After the Korean War budgetary constraints exacerbated the manning conditions, while the general reliance of the Eisenhower administration on nuclear deterrence put the fiscal emphasis on weapons systems rather than on the combat divisions.

  1. Ltr, NGB to AG, California, 15 Jun 54, sub; Organization, Conversion, Reorganization, and Redesignation of National Guard Units (40th Division), NG-AROTO 325.4-Calif (4 Jun 54), 40th Inf Div file, Ltr, NGB to CofS, Div of Military and Naval Affairs, New York, 15 Dec 54, sub: Organization, Reorganization, Conversion, and Redesignation, National Guard Units of the 27th Infantry Division to be the 27th Armored Division, NG-AROTO 325.4-NY (13 Dec 54), 27th Inf Bde file, Ltr, NGB to AG, Georgia, 17 Oct 55, sub: Allotment, Conversion, Redesignation, Organization, Reorganization and Withdrawal of Federal Recognition, Army National Guard Units, NG-AROTO 325.4 (30 Sep 55) GA, GA NG file, Ltr, NGB to AG, Florida, 17 Oct 55, sub: Allotment, Conversion, Redesignation, Organization, Reorganization and Withdrawal of Federal Recognition, Army National Guard Units, NG-AROTO 325.4-Fla, FL NG file, Ltr, NGB to AG, Tennessee, 20 Oct 54, sub: National Guard Troop Allotment (Tennessee), 20 Oct 54, NG-AROTO 325.4-Tenn, TN NG file and GO 33, North Carolina National Guard, 18 Oct 54, NC state file, DAMH-HSO; Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1955, p, 15, and 1956, p. 21.
  2. DA Bull 12, 1955; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, pp. 120–27.