Force or other organic divisional weapons assumed the nuclear fire support mission of the rockets, The division fielded an aviation group (a general aviation support company and one assault support and two assault aviation battalions). Divisional helicopters numbered 335, Although the Howze Board believed the number of ground vehicles could be cut by two-thirds, the division was authorized 1,500, or approximately half the number in the other types of ROAD divisions. The vehicles moved supplies, artillery, and antitank weapons and helped in ground reconnaissance. The airmobile infantry battalion had one combat support company (reconnaissance, mortar, and antitank resources) and three rifle companies, Although the battalion lacked ENTACs, 4.2-inch mortars, and .50-caliber machine guns, the infantrymen had a number of new weapons. The M14 rifle was superseded by the lighter MX16E1 (M16), which put out more firepower and was supplemented by the M79 40-mm. grenade launcher with a dedicated grenadier.[1]
The question as to whether the airmobile division should replace the airborne division had not been resolved. Planners decided that one brigade—three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion—was to be authorized airborne-qualified personnel as an interim measure.[2]
In summary, the ROAD reorganization ensured the Army's ability to offer flexible responses to changing world conditions. On 1 July 1965, the Army's division and brigade forces consisted of 45 divisions (16 in the Regular Army, 23 in the National Guard, and 6 in the Army Reserve) and 17 brigades (6 in the Regular Army, 7 in the National Guard, and 4 in the Army Reserve). Of the Regular Army divisions, eight served outside the continental United States and eight within. Divisions and brigades in the three components had more flexibility than ever before. As in the past, personnel problems prevented the Army from fielding divisions at their ideal strength, but ROAD's inherent capability for interchanging battalions meant that, if necessary, some units could be brought to wartime standards quickly, The divisions, however, still awaited their true test—combat.
From the Army's point of view the Kennedy era had produced measurable organizational gains. The budget-driven pentomic divisions had been adopted primarily for political purposes and had never been popular within the Army. While Army leaders were enamored of the new airmobile concept backed by McNamara and others, the ROAD divisions were more popular, providing the Army with solid standard divisional bases and the ability to tailor brigade-size task forces within the division using a variable mix of combat battalions. And with Kennedy's support for expanding the ground components and technological capabilities, the future of the Army seemed more secure in the budget-driven defense community,
