within its own limits; that their having any effect elsewhere is by courtesy of nations; that this is by the laws of nations and is only permitted so far as it does not occasion a prejudice to the rights of the other governments or their citizens. He adds, that in this, we are to consult mutual convenience and the tacit consent of different people. He further says that it is the law of the state, and this tacit consent, which gives effect to foreign laws without, however, any prejudice to its sovereignty or the rights of its citizens, and regarding the mutual convenience of the governments, that is the foundation of these rules. He says that if the law of the place is inconsistent with our law in these respects, it is reasonable that “we observe our own laws and not the foreign laws,” and that these cases form exceptions from the general rule, in favor of the lear loci, established by the consent of nations. He further states, as an illustration of his doctrine, that if, in a particular country, particular kinds of merchandise are prohibited to be sold there, a contract made in another country, to sell them there, is void. This is, in principle, the very case now before us, He further says, however, that the law of the place is imperious as to crimes, punishments and pardons; for that a crime committed in one country is a crime every where, and that the general convenience of nations is consulted by this rule.
Fonblanque taking up this passage, yields to it his unqualified approbation. He says that to give a binding force to a contract in another country, it must not violate the rights of persons not parties to it; that it must not violate a moral duty, or a right derived to a third person under the law of the state in which it is attempted to be enforced; for that in such a case “in tali conflictu-magis jus nostrum, quam jus alienum servemus.” All these principles
