be ultimately fought.' The words show how little the Governor-General agreed with Lord Palmerston that this 'was not an European but an Indian question.' On February 8, Lord Auckland writes to the Secret Committee that he is 'still inclined to anticipate the adherence of Dost Muhammad to British interests'; but the mission of a Russian agent to Kábul demands, in his opinion, 'the serious consideration of the home authorities.' Trusting still to form his rampart, he was not disposed, even if Herát fell, at once to adopt an active policy, or to resort to 'any immediate interference by arms or money.' It is evident that Lord Auckland in the spring of 1838 still hoped to obtain the alliance of Dost Muhammad, and to form for India a zone of security through the medium of allied powers on her frontiers. He would thus have carried out his share in the joint policy, and have given effect to the instructions of 1836. He might then throw upon Great Britain the settlement of her struggle with Russia for ascendency in Persian counsels at Teherán.
Sir John Kaye has insisted much on the position that, while Russia and Persia were making large promises and holding out great hopes to Dost Muhammad Khán, Captain Burnes had nothing to tender but assurances of goodwill. This, if containing an element of truth, is far from being the whole truth. What Russia may have promised is conjectural. Dost Muhammad was assured by Captain Burnes of protection against Sikh and Persian. But the Amír did not fear
