attribute the Afghán war to the pernicious influence of the three Secretaries who had accompanied Lord Auckland to Upper India, the policy which led to it is found to have originated not at Simla, but in London, the consequences which followed must be laid on shoulders other than those of Lord Auckland. But all that is needful here to remind the reader is that the aim of this narrative is to trace out, as against the fly-moving-the-wheel theory of Sir John Kaye, the several elements of which the action taken by Lord Auckland was the outcome. It is not sought to apportion responsibility between the several statesmen concerned ; still less to express an opinion as to the merits of the policy pursued.
In the course of October there issued the much discussed Proclamation, bearing date October i, which decreed the fall of Dost Muhammad Khan. 'It would have been much more effective,' wrote Lord Auckland, 'if I had not had the fear of Downing Street before my eyes.' The real motives which led to the war are as studiously kept out of sight in that Proclamation as they were afterwards rigorously snipped out of the sheets which appeared in the first Afghán Blue Book. Diplomatic susceptibilities must be consulted. There must be no mention of Russia, though the action of Russia on Persia was the causa causans. There must be no allusion to instructions from England; above all, not a whisper of the despatch of 1836. It is purely a quarrel between the Government of India and Dost Muhammad. 'The King hath run bad
