spirit of the revolt, could not entertain such a supposition. The attempt to separate the comparatively innocent, to appeal through them to the feelings of the Regiments yet in obedience, seemed in my deliberate opinion, and still seems, the right and useful thing to do at that time. The Proclamation was simply and briefly worded, that it might be understood by the soldiery for whom it was meant. If ever there was a chance of the kind, it was at first, and I tried to seize it.'
The last point on which something must be said is the conduct of affairs in Agra itself. Three lines of action presented themselves. The Lieutenant-Governor and all the Christian community might withdraw into the Fort and await events; or the women and children might be sent into the Fort; or the whole community might remain in their homes, subject to adequate precautions against surprise. By a section of Mr. Colvin's advisers, the second course was violently pressed upon him. He decided on adopting the last. For a moment, on May 13, when the position was in its first obscurity, he thought of sending the women and children into the Fort; but, on reflection, he refused. The Fort was unprovisioned, and in every respect unprepared. His military force was too small to be divided. There was no mutinous force at hand; therefore there was no pressing risk. It was his duty to show a resolute front. He had with him an English regiment, and could organize volunteers. His officers in their Districts were endeavouring to hold their posts. He would not set the example of seeking safety behind walls. He could ensure at least the
