land was in possession of instructions pointing to what would now be termed a forward policy. We shall find that such in truth was the case. Now, though Lord Auckland might succeed in attaining his ends by diplomacy, he must face the possibility of war. He could not be sole master of his means. This uncertainty would be reflected in his correspondence; which we see alternately breathing hope and apprehension. That we have here the explanation of the seeming contradiction in his language will be clearer after perusal of the despatch bearing date June 25, which Lord Auckland received in 1836, from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. This Committee, in plain English, was Sir John Hobhouse, who, as President of the Board of Control, had a seat in the Cabinet. This despatch is not mentioned in Sir John Kaye's History of the Afghan War. Yet without it, the whole of Lord Auckland's policy is unintelligible. We shall see that when finally he decided on war with Dost Muhammad, he referred to this despatch as the warrant for the decision to which he had been guided.
'We have received' (wrote the Secret Committee) 'from the Commissioners for the affairs of India, copies of two letters which the Right Honourable Henry Ellis addressed to Viscount Palmerston on February 25 and April 1 last — the former stating the particulars of an overture said to have been made by Dost Muhammad of Kábul to the Sháh of Persia in view to the conquest and partition of the territories of Prince Kamrán of Herát, and the latter mentioning that a similar overture had been received by the Sháh from the
