Sotomayor, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–949
JOHN STURGEON, PETITIONER v. BERT FROST, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ALASKA REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March 26, 2019]
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring.
Professors have long asked law students to interpret a hypothetical ordinance that prohibits bringing “a vehicle into the park.”[1] The debate usually centers on what counts as a “vehicle.” Is a moped forbidden? How about a baby stroller? In this case, we can all agree that John Sturgeon’s hovercraft is a vehicle. But now we ask whether he has brought it “into the park”—and, if not, how a river’s designation as “outside the park” will affect future attempts to regulate there.
The Court decides that the Nation River is not parkland, and I join the Court’s opinion because it offers a cogent reading of §103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 94 Stat. 2371, 16 U. S. C. §3101 et seq. I write separately to emphasize the important regulatory pathways that the Court’s decision leaves open for future exploration.
The Court holds only that the National Park Service may not regulate the Nation River as if it were within
- ↑ See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 36 (2012); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958).
